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Abstract
In this paper we briefly review and analyze three published proofs
of Chaitin’s theorem, the celebrated information-theoretic version of
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem. Then, we discuss our main perplex-
ity concerning a key step common to all these demonstrations.
1 Introduction
The notion of algorithmic (or program-size) complexity, suggested for the first
time in the 1960s, identifies the complexity of a binary string with the size of
the shortest computer program that computes that string as output. In the
1970s, mathematician G. J. Chaitin made use of this notion to reformulate
in terms of information-theoretic arguments the first theorem of Go¨del on
the incompleteness of formal axiomatic systems. Chaitin’s main result states
that a formal axiomatic system coded in a computer program of n bits is
unable to prove that a binary sequence exists with a complexity greater
than n bits, whereas it can be easily proved that there are actually infinitely
many strings with this property. The proof of Chaitin’s result is based on the
logical paradox which would arise if a program of n bits were able to prove
the existence, and therefore to generate a specific string of a complexity
greater than n bits. In this paper we briefly analyze three published proofs
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of Chaitin’s theorem and argue that they rely on a questionable, a priori
paradoxical assumption which seems to invalidate from the beginning the
demonstration ab absurdo: as a matter of fact, the logical paradox reached
at the end of the proofs seems to have been tacitly inserted at the beginning
of the proofs and therefore only a tautological, useless absurdum is obtained.
2 A questionable aspect of Chaitin’s approach
In order to explain what represents, according to the author, a dubious point
in Chaitin’s approach to the incompleteness of formal systems, we give here
a more detailed description of his result.
In Chaitin [1] and Gardner [2] a formal axiomatic system is described as
a program for an idealized computer, a routine of c bits which makes use of n
bits of axioms and rules of inference to generate systematically and check all
possible proofs in order of their size: first all proofs of one bit, then all proofs
of two bits, and so forth (this kind of computation is known as the British
Museum algorithm). After having generated a proof, according to Chaitin [1]
and Gardner [2], the routine tests whether it is the first one proving that a
specific binary sequence is of a complexity greater than the number of bits in
the program, n+c. When the routine finds such a proof, it prints the specific
binary sequence and then halts. Now, the logical paradox arises quite clearly:
a program of n+ c bits supposedly calculates a number that no program its
size should be able to calculate.
This is the way in which Chaitin [1] and Gardner [2] show why a formal
axiomatic system of n+ c bits is unable to prove the existence of any specific
number with algorithmic complexity greater than n+ c bits. Actually, there
are infinitely many number of complexity greater than n+c bits. As a matter
of fact, with a number of bits less than or equal to n + c it is possible to
create at the most 2n+c+1 − 2 different binary strings1, each one of them is
a program that might generate a number. Thus, at the most 2n+c+1 − 2
numbers have algorithmic complexity less than or equal to n + c bits, while
1That is, we add up the number of all possible strings of one bit (2), that of all possible
strings of two bits (22), and so on up to n+ c bits:
n+c∑
i=1
2i = 2 + 22 + 23 + ...+ 2n+c = 2n+c+1 − 2.
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there are infinitely many integer numbers.
Chaitin [3, 4] shows that there is a program of length nearly equal to
log2N + k bits to calculate a number which supposedly can not be calcu-
lated by a program shorter than N bits. Here k is the dimension of the
proof-checking routine, essentially the formal axiomatic system, and log2N
is nearly equal to the dimension of the binary expansion of decimal num-
ber N . Since log2N + k becomes much smaller than N for sufficiently large
N , we have again that such formal axiomatic system is unable to prove the
existence of any number of a complexity greater than N bits.
Here we quote a passage from Chaitin [4] in which the working scheme of
such program is described:
You start running through all possible proofs in the formal ax-
iomatic system in size order. You apply the proof-checking algo-
rithm to each proof. And after filtering out all the invalid proofs,
you search for the first proof that a particular positive integer
requires at least an N-bit program.
The algorithm that I’ve just described is very slow but it is very
simple. It’s basically just the proof-checking algorithm, which is
k bits long, and the number N , which is log2N bits long. So the
total number of bits is just
log2N + k
as was claimed. That concludes the proof of my incompleteness
result that I wanted to discuss with Go¨del.
Let us now come to what appears to be a rather unsatisfactory aspect of
the approaches mentioned above. For the sake of simplicity, we concentrate
on the last proof, but our point holds also for proofs [1], [2] and [3] with small
changes.
It is not clear how the sole decimal number N is enough to the formal
axiomatic system to identify univocally and unequivocally the desired proof.
Keeping in mind the argument in Chaitin [4], let us divide the main algorithm
of log2N + k bits into two programs of k1 and log2N + k2 bits respectively,
such that k1 + k2 ≃ k (meaning “not too much greater than k”), and such
that the concatenation of the first and the second program works as the
main algorithm. The first one is the pure proof-checking algorithm, namely
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that which generates all strings in increasing order of size and checks their
formal correctness within the formal axiomatic system. The second one ac-
complishes the pure searching task; it mechanically runs through all valid
proofs provided by the first algorithm and tries to find a particular binary
string. In its searching task it uses as a guide only what is coded in its own
log2N + k2 bits. Like every pure searching algorithm, this one is able to find
univocally and unequivocally only what is exactly expressible or compress-
ible in at most log2N + k2 bits, not more. A successful search occurs in the
following two cases:
a) when there is an exact matching between the string memorized in the
searching algorithm (and thus, a string necessarily less than log2N+k2
bits long) and one of the strings provided by the first algorithm.
b) when there is an exact matching between a string longer than log2N+k2
bits, but generated by a sub-program of the searching algorithm (and
thus, again less complex than log2 N + k2 bits), and one of the strings
provided by the first algorithm.
In both cases, the searching algorithm is able to find only strings less complex
than log2N + k2 bits.
But we already know that what we are searching is not compressible in
less than N bits. The algorithmic complexity of the desired theorem (or,
equivalently, the algorithmic complexity of its proof, since the proof provides
the theorem) is necessarily greater than N bits because it generates a string s
more complex than N bits as output. Therefore, we know from the beginning
that the searching algorithm will not be able to spot it. An easy way to show
that fact ironically follows from the very notion of algorithmic complexity,
as the Chaitin’s theorem does.
Let us forget for a while the subject of this paper. According to the no-
tion of algorithmic complexity, any string l of algorithmic complexity greater
than N bits could not be unequivocally recognized using an algorithm of a
complexity of log2N + k2 bits, if log2N + k2 is less that N . As if it were the
case, it would be possible to write an algorithmic procedure of complexity
∼ log2N +k2 which systematically generates all the strings in increasing size
order until it recognizes the desired one. But, in this case there would be a
contradiction since the algorithmic complexity of the generated string would
necessarily be not greater than ∼ log2N + k2 bits. Now, returning to our
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point, what difference does it make if l is a whatever string more complex
than N bits or is the string coding our desired theorem? And this limit
affects the searching algorithm, not the proof-checking one. Indeed, all the
above does not eliminate a priori the possibility that among all the valid
proofs generated and checked by the first algorithm there is one which states
that a binary string s is more complex than N bits.
It is known from the work of A. M. Turing that algorithms coding formal
axiomatic systems have inescapable limits in proof-checking. These limits are
strictly related to the undecidability of the halting problem, namely the non-
existence of a general algorithmic procedure to establish in a finite number
of steps whether a computer program halts or not, simply by analyzing its
code. Indeed, it can be demonstrated that the unsolvability of the halting
problem implies the uncomputability of the program-size complexity.
Instead, in the case of Chaitin [4] the claimed limit seems to be not a
fundamental one. What can be rigorously deduced from his arguments is
only a trivial limit in the mechanical recognition of the proof, not in the
capability of the system in checking the formal correctness of such proof.
Substantially, when Chaitin [4] states that it is possible to write a program
only log2N + k bits long to generate a number of a complexity greater than
N bits, he seems to assume from the beginning that it is always possible
to compress any theorem of this kind to k bits plus the bits which give the
binary expansion of N . Hence, no wonder if he gets a logical paradox then.
3 Conclusions
From what is outlined above it seems that an obvious, clear relation between
the size of a formal axiomatic system and its capabilities/limitations in check-
ing proofs can not be claimed. For instance, a formal axiomatic system of N
bits could be able in principle to check the formal correctness of the proof
that a specific sequence is of a complexity of C bits, with C ≫ N . The point
is that this proof must be provided as input to the program which codes the
proof-checking system. All this is by no means font of logical paradox. For
instance, in the case such proof exists, and in the case such existence means
that the formal axiomatic system of N bits is able to partially resolve the
halting problem for every string/program in increasing size order up to C
bits, then we have to tell anyway to the formal axiomatic system at which
point to stop its analysis of the halting problem. Namely, we have to furnish
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the ordinal number of the last string/program to be checked, i.e. an extra C
bits2. Otherwise, the system will never halt, vainly trying to establish the
halting problem on the first undecidable program. Therefore, we simply have
a program of N + C bits which generates a string as complex as C bits.
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2Let us list all strings of 1, 2, 3, ..., n bits, in increasing (lexicographical) order:
N# 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ...
p 0 1 00 10 000 100 101 111 0000 ...
where N# is the ordinal number of the string, while p denotes the binary string itself. As
it can be seen p ≃ (N#)2 and thus the size of p in bits is approximately equal to log2 N#.
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